Identification of Informative Frequency Components of Video Path Electromagnetic Emanations for Visual Data Leakage Protection

Davronbekov, Dilmurod; Foziljonov, Khojiakbar; Sultonova, Makhbubakhon; Mukhamedzhanov, Kamola

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Proceedings of International Conference on Applied Innovation in IT · 2026/07/22 · Vol. 14 · Issue 4 · pp. 1471–1477

Identification of Informative Frequency Components of Video Path Electromagnetic Emanations for Visual Data Leakage Protection

Dilmurod Davronbekov, Khojiakbar Foziljonov, Makhbubakhon Sultonova, Kamola Dadamatova and Amir Mukhamedzhanov

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Abstract

This paper examines the problem of visual information leakage through compromising electromagnetic emanations (CEE) from video paths of computing systems. It is shown that image reconstruction significantly depends on the distribution of informative spectral components of the CEE and their relationship to harmonics of the video signal's clock (pixel) signal. This study aims to identify frequency components at which visual information recovery is possible, as well as frequencies within which image reconstruction is difficult or impossible. The methodological basis of the study includes experimental frequency analysis of the CEE using a software-defined radio receiver and specialized software. During the experiment, multiple harmonics of the clock frequency are calculated, emission levels are measured at the corresponding frequency points, and image reconstruction is performed based on the recorded spectral components. The results show that the informative components of the CEE are unevenly distributed across the spectrum and are concentrated primarily at specific harmonic frequencies, where stable recovery of visual information is ensured. The practical significance of this work lies in the substantiation of the possibility of using selective protection methods aimed at suppressing the most vulnerable frequency components, which allows for increasing the effectiveness of preventing visual data leakage while reducing excess electromagnetic influence and maintaining the operability of computing systems.

Keywords

Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations Video Path Pixel Clock Harmonics Frequency Analysis Image Reconstruction Software-Defined Radio Information Leakage Protection Electromagnetic Security

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